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The Influence of Explicit Instructions to Pla~ 
Upon Performance. 
The purpose of this investigation is to study the 
measurable influence of explicit instructions to plan upon 
the performance of complex tasks as contrasted with perform-
ance of the same tasks under such spontaneous tendency to 
plan as may be present without explicit instructions. 
The subjects used in this experiment were sixty 
children between the ages of eleven and fourteen years. This 
group was divided into an experimental group of fifteen boys 
and fifteen girls and a control group of the same number of 
boys and girls. The subjects in the control group were 
paired with the subjects in the experimental group according 
to sex, age and I. Q. 
After the pairing was completed, the subjects of 
both groups were asked to perform two tasks. The first task 
consisted in arranging fifty sticks of different lengths, 
colors and thicknesses in ten boxes in the best possible 
order. The second task was the construction of a bird-house 
out of several parts. These tasks were selected because 
they require definite steps to be followed in their solution. 
•• 
standard procedure was followed throughout, except in the 
.' 
case of the experimental group, who received explicit instruc-
tions to plan their work. 
A record of each child's performance was kept. The 
time required by him to complete the tasks, the number of movee 
and the number of trials were recorded. Also, any evidence of 
planning or not planning was noted and an attempt was made, to 
study the effect of such behavior upon the performance of the 
subject. 
Planning as referred to in this experiment is 
synonymous with reflective thinking, or thinking with an aim 
or purpose or end toward which the thinking tends. It is the 
kind of thinking especially adapted to solving complex 
problems as opposed to random thinking which leads to no par-
ticular or definite termination. 
In productive thinking, planning is necessary in 
order to attain the end of thought, which is the solution of 
the problems of everyday life. Random thinking is a meta-
phorical Pandora's box, out of which fly many of the ills 
humans are heir to. Reflective thought, on the other hand, 
is the only hope left with which we may right these wrongs, 
political, social, economic and educational, let loose by 
random thinking. 
We assume with Porteus, Goddard, Binet and others 
that the capacity to plan is related to intelligent solutions 
of problems. By our instructions to plan we hope to enable 
the subject to direct his activities with foresight, ~nd to 
plan according to ends-in-view, or purpose of which he is 
aware. In short, we hope to convert action that is largely 
impulsive into intelligent action. 
3, 
One of the first investigators to point out that 
planning is a most important capacity in intelligent behavior 
was Stanley Porteous (41:65). In discussing characteristics 
of the feeble-minded, he states that, generally speaking, they 
cannot be trusted to engage, unsupervised, in work requiring 
forethought in planning, care and judgment in execution. He 
says that the feeble-minded have a place in industry, but it 
is in doing work which takes plain, straight-forward, piece-
meal effort, wherein there is no need to envisage the whole, 
nor to make the necessary adjustments so that the finished 
result will harmonize with a preconceived plan, for these 
are beyond feeble-minded capacity. If any individual is 
found who is capable of doing these things, it is almost 
certain that he is not a mental defective, no matter how 
inferior his abstract intelligence may be. 
In a later chapter S. Porteus (41:66) says, "In 
their attempt to adjust themselves to the general social as 
well as the school situation, the most outstanding weakness 
of the defective seemed to be lack of planning capacity. 
They seem unable to keep the end of a task clearly in ~nd, 
or to adopt a critical attitude towards their own work and 
to make the adjustments necessary to the fulfillm~nt of the 
plan or design as originally conceived." 
H. H. Goddard agrees with Porteus (41:66) in de-
scribing the capacities of the highest grade feeble-minded 
when he notes their ability to do good work, but only under 
directions. He claims they are unable to plan anything. 
The value ot a manls lite and the effectiveness 
of his work, according to Wm. F. Book (8:24), depend (1) on 
the character of his ideals or purposes and plans; (2) on the 
intensity of his desire for realization of these, or on the 
strength and persistence of his determination to carry them 
out; (3) on the amount of energy and health at his disposal 
for their realization and (4) on the kind and amount of 
knowledge and skill which he has acquired to aid him in 
finding the best way of obtaining them. 
Concerning planning, Wm. H. Burton (6:558) says, 
1I0ne of the marks of intelligence and speCial ability is 
foresight and anticipatory planning. The stupid, the care-
less, the shiftless and lazy do not plan.· 
In 1921 the Editor of the Journal ot Education 
asked seventeen leading investigators to contribute to a 
symposium on, "What I conceive intelligence to be and by 
what means it can best be measured by group tests." 
Many of these men included the capacity to pl;n in 
their definition of intelligence. E. L. Thorndike (22:124) 
in his discussion of intelligent behavior states,. "It would, 
however, be difficult and probably unwise to try to separate 
off sharply the responses concerned with directly sensed 
situations from responses concerned with planning, or those 
concerned with concrete features of things and men from those 
connected with ideas and symbols. The power of response to 
ideas rather than direct experience may be called the more 
intellectual variety of intellect." 
L. M. Terman (22:127) conceives an individual as 
intelligent in proportion as he is able to carryon abstract 
thinking. "Add a large measure of ability to associate ab-
stract ideas into complex systems and a pick-and-shovel man 
can design a new type of engine, draft the plans for a sky-
scraper or discover a curative serum." 
F. N. Freeman (22:133) would include, among other 
things, in a definition of intelligence, the judicious man-
agment of the processes of learning or reflection; the ad(jP-· 
tiOfi· of intellectual purposes and the adaptation of means 
to their satisfaction; and sensitiveness to significant 
connections between experiences which illuminate one another 
or which are effective in building up systems of thought. 
o. 
L. L. Thurstone (22:201) distinguishes between the 
bright and the profound intellect. The former aims for effect-
-iveness in the immediate present, while the latter deals with 
earlier and more abstract relations in its adjustments~' Such 
a profound mind is concerned with the analysis of temporarily 
remote ends. He conceives intelligence to be the" capacity to 
inhibit instinctive behavior in an unfinished stage of its 
formation and to modify it at that stage by means of an 
imaginal stimulus which is relatively remote from that which 
is immediately and perceptually present. The imaginal stimulus 
in intelligent behavior becomes conscious as an alternative 
to be controlled, accepted or rejected rationally. 
Herbert Woodrow's (22:207) concept of intelligent 
behavior is simply the degree to which it attains success, 
but success has no real value except by some reference to 
want, desire, intention, plan or purpose. 
Michael Maher, S. J., (31:583), too, in comparing 
animal behavior with that of human or rational behavior, 
states that brute creatures do not exhibit any individual 
free variation in method and plan of action, and that in-
tellectual progress, which ought to mark the presence of 
personal intelligence. From this statement of Maher's it 
is evident that he agrees with other authors that the capacity 
to plan is related to intelligence. 
Very few attempts have been made to test planning 
ability as such. In 1912 M. R. Fernald and W. Healy (12) 
experimented with a series of tests of planning ability and 
by means of an ingenious puzzle-box they presented a problem 
in which success was dependent upon working through a series 
of operations in proper sequence. By manipulating a b~tton­
hook through a hole in the side of a box, rings attached to 
various strings could be released and the box opened, the 
subject being able to plan the operations by looking at the 
mechanism through a glass top. The test was scored on speed, 
but the record was so affected by the manual dexterity re-
quired that it did not constitute a good test of planning and 
so never came into general use. 
In 1922 D. R. Morgenthau (34) made a study of, "Some 
Well Known Mental Tests," which she compared and evaluated. 
In the course of her work she made an experimental study to 
, 
secure a measure of p1anfulness by using various parts of a 
number of tests. The elements in each test that seemed to 
measure planfu1ness were selected. These were divided into 
two separate sets and results compared. The correlation was 
.763 between the two tests, which was fairly high, since 
seventeen was the highest score on each section. She does 
not claim this to be a criterion to prove that the tests 
actually measured the trait which she presupposed it would. 
She does claim, however, that it is better than any single 
test, because it includes a variety of materials. 
The most recent work in the field of testing 
planning ability is that of Stanley D. Porteus (41:67). His 
subjects were 10w-grad~, feeble-minded children. He measured 
the time required for them to get out of a locked room, the 
problem being complicated for the more intelligent by making 
.' them go through certain preparatory steps before the key to 
the room could be obtained and used. It was found that this 
method admitted of a rough classification of children by 
ability. Those of the lowest grades could merely turn the 
key and open the door, children of better planning capacity 
were able to climb on a chair 8.nd obtain the key when it hung 
out of reach. Still others learned after several demonstrat-
ions how to obtain a second key, unlock a cupboard, climb on 
a chair, and prooure the door key. Beyond proving that de-
fectives were particularily slow at learning the sequence of 
steps in a complicated situation, the test was of little value 
as it could not be properly standardized. 
Another series of tests conducted by Porteus (41:67) 
used street plans as testing material. The problem set the 
defective was to follow directions so as to make his way on 
the plan from one designated point to another. This proved 
to be more of a test of memory for directions than planning, 
but it was while drawing an imaginary system of roads, in the 
form of the present nine-year design of the maze tests, that 
the idea of using a series of mazes occurred to the experi-
menter. 
The problem of finding a way out of a printed maze, 
in which blind alleys occurred at various pOints, seemed to 
Porteus very much more a test of planning capacity than merely 
following instructions. A series of these tests was made in 
8. 
1919 and revised in 1933. Their author claims they measure 
.' the capacities of fore~hought and planning, prudence and 
mental alertness in meeting new situations. 
Attitudes. 
Percival Symonds (48) reviews the meaning of the 
term "attitude ll in a paper entitled, If What is Attitude? I. 
In the writings of educators and psychologists he found the 
term referred to as (1) great organic drives, more familiarly 
known as purposes or plans; (2) muscular set or adjustment; 
(3) generalized conduct; (4) neural set or readiness to make 
certain reactions; (5) emotional concomitant of action; (6) 
the feeling concomitant to action; (7) verbal responses in-
dicating liking or disliking, acceptance or rejection. This 
author concludes that none of these refer to conduction units 
9. 
which yield a peculiar type of reaction that may be called an 
attitude. He thinks the term is a duplicate of skill or habit 1 
or, that it refers to particular features of reaction units. 
Read Bain (5) defines attitude as acquired and con-
ditioned action patterns that motivate human social behavior, 
and says that attitudes which do not motivate adjustment 
(or maladjustment) have little significance for human beings. 
His attitude theory rests on the fact that the stimuli capa-
10 
b1e of activating the neuromuscular mechanisms, whether innate 
or acquired, are very numerous and very variable. .' Under 
appropriate conditions, almost any stimuli may be substituted 
for the stimuli originally adequate to activate any given 
action pattern. While the functional motor mechanisms, innate 
or acquired, are relatively stable, many quite diverse'stimuli 
may be integrated with these specific responses. The result 
is a new total stimulus-response action pattern which is 
partly original but which in most human behavior is largely 
the result of experimental conditioning in cultural situations. 
The problem of human motivation is the problem of acquired 
responses. This writer believes that the term attitude and 
opinion refer in a general way to types of acquired action-
patterns that are definitely concerned with human motivation. 
A.s previously stated, an attempt wes made in this 
experiment to establish an attitude of planning through ex-
plicit instructions to plan. The term attitude as used in 
this studW is similar to attitude as defined in an experi-
mental account of a study of conscious attitude by H. M. 
Clark (10). This author defines attitude as ideas or meanings 
which have been set off in the organism by external and pre-
ceding or accompanying determination. These ideas, he says, 
do not characterize the particular situation, but do character-
ize the particular and the immediate nature of the responding 
organism. They may, therefore, vary the nature of the re-
sponse which the situation brings about. Attitudes are in-
~· ____ -------------------------------------------------------------=l=l~. ~ 
tellectual and emotional. In both case the attitude is a 
~ 
meaning or idea developing in the organism from a situation 
in the enviroment. The intellectual attitude modifies the 
response in the direction of the modifying idea. The emotional 
attitude modifies the response, but this modification is due 
not only indirectly to the idea causing the emotion, but 
directly to the emotion. It is the intellectual attitude 
with which the present study is concerned. 
Clark began his study of attitudes not from concern 
about the nature of consciousness that makes up the attitude, 
but from the concern about the objectively determinable 
modifications of reBponse brought about by the presence of 
the particular attitude. This is the aim of the present in-
vestigation also. 
Clark's investigation studied both the intellectual 
and the emotional attitude. The idea selected for the first 
study was that generalization was to be expected from a series 
of separate problems being solved. For the second study the 
idea selected for investigation was that one is better or 
poorer in the performance of a particular task than other 
members of one's group. Both these ideas were studied in 
relation to the chang~produced in consciOUS functioning and 
behavior at the time of learning and in relation to their 
value when recall was attempted. The problem was also to 
find out if individuals of different mentalities and dif-
ferent chronoligical ages reacted in the same manner to 
III""~ 12. -~--------------------------------------------------------------~~~ 
these variations of attitudei and to discover the effect of 
.' the attitude when the generalization had different degrees of 
complexity. In every case the subject was led to believe 
that the problem of learning was being investigated and not 
that the attitudes were under observation. They were also 
paired for intelligence so as to eliminate this as a factor 
explanatory of differences in performance. 
In the study of intellectual attitude, nonsense 
material was used. The attitude was brought about by vari-
ations in the instructions accompanying the main problem. 
In one group, the subjects were given no instructions; the 
second group were instructed to seek a generalization; and 
the third group was given the generalization outright. Clark's 
first group was similar to the control group and his second 
group to the experimental group of the present study. 
Group one, the author calls the trial-and-error 
group. Group two displayed a tendency to plan either native 
or because some element in the situation caused them to try 
a plan. This often resulted in getting off on the wrong 
track, after which they seemed unable to discard the unsat-
isfactory plan. Group three seemed to have a tendency from 
the first to plan, and after a few unsuccessful trials hit 
upon a satisfactory plan and discarded immediately those 
which did not work. 
The writer concludes that if subjects are divided 
into two groups, one of higher and one of lower I. Q., the 
;~ .. ~~we of learning with any gfven attitude is dependent in 
upon intelligence. He found, also, that the attit~de 
resulting from no information as to progress made gave better 
eonditions for learning than attitudes resulting from the 
knowledge of failure or success. 
Stella B. McCharles (32) studied the effect o~ 
certain attitudes on the ability to solve problems. Each 
group was given instructions calculated to produce a di~ferent 
\ attitude, such as pugnacity, friendliness, alertness, relax-
ation, and no attitude at all, except the problem. Groups 
while maintaining a certain attitude solved the Yerkes Multi-
ple Choice Problems. Questions were asked to determine 
whether they had been able to take and maintain the attitude. 
A significant difference was found in the results obtained 
trom the groups tested. The pugnacity attitude promoted 
4efinitely a higher efficiencw in solving problems. 
S. Sandersen (43) found in an experiment to s~udy 
intention in motor learning that the intention to learn is 
the essential factor in the learning process. The tasks set 
were learning to trace a stylus maze and a number sheet of 
identical pattern. The specific mental set was instilled in 
the learner by specific instructions without his awareness of 
future application. To one group instructions to learn the 
pattern were given, and to another group instructions to work 
quickly. When both speed and pattern group shifted fron 
number sheet to maze, to be learned for speed, the pattern 
l4 • 
.• intention proved superior. Less transference occurred from 
.' maze to number sheet, with no superiority for the pattern. 
An experimental study of observational attitudes 
was made by O. D. Anderson (3). His problem was to determine 
some of the factors which may enter in· to modify the formal 
instructions of an experiment. He presented the subjects with 
colors and tones, and directed them to note and characterize 
both the initial way of taking the experience and also any 
ehange in the mode which might occur in the: period of per-
oeption. Five attitudes were found; the casual survey, in-
quiring survey of objects, critical survey of su~ject as 
subject, particularizing survey of objects, personal evalu-
ation of objects as failing to conform to some conventional 
standard. 
In a second part of the same experiment the subject 
was given characterizations of these attitudes and told to 
assume one and report on the course of the experience occurring 
under it. It was found impossible to maintain the particular 
attitude throughout a period of stimUlation any longer than 
tive to ten seconds; the performance demanded by the formal 
-1nstructions appeared about half the time. 
The investigator pOints out the inadequacy of formal 
instruction even with trained subjects. It is also evident 
to him that the view which regards performance as a uresponse" 
unequivocally determined by stimulus is inadequate. 
... ~O. ~ .. ----------------------------------------------. 
w. Peters states that two attitudes are possible to 
observe in an experiment. These are the leptisch, or passive, 
and the ktetische, or active, the latter being induced by more 
difficult tasks and tending to give better results. He claims 
that some observers natura+ly assume one attitude and some the 
other. 
To test and in general substantiate these state-
ments of Peters, G. Luntowski (27) conducted an experiment 
in which the subjects were required to divide a given linear 
distance into three equal parts by shifting beads on a string. 
The subjects were young adults of both sexes. 
Ten observers in this experiment were given no 
directions as to the attitude to be assumed or method used. 
They were questioned as to how they performed it when they 
had finished. Out of eighty-two experiments, sixty were 
carried out wholly actively and eleven wholly passively. 
Seven subjects observed actively four ti~es as frequently 
as passively and the remaining four subjects were more 
passive than active. The active group showed more gener-
alized body movements, corrected the position of the beads 
more often, and took longer for the task. They had more 
restricted attention span, tended to break the space into 
sections successfully, and were rarely conscious of the 
whole. They used only one hand, while the passive group 
moved the beads simultaneously with both hands. The errors 
were smaller in the active group. 
,.., 16. 
------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
In the second part of the same experiment four 
.. 
active subjects and three passive subjects were selected. 
An equal number of instructions favoring active and passive 
attitudes were given in variable order, the statements of the 
subjects again taken following ~he tasks. The active in-
structions were followed every time successfully in almost 
all cases. The passive instructions were followed completely 
by only one subject every time, seventy per cent of the time 
by five subjects and never by the remaining subjects. The 
same differences were noted as to the time, errors, etc. as 
were found in the first experiment. 
The author concludes that while most subjects tend 
strongly to one attitude, the active can usually be assumed. 
The difference of progress that would be developed 
by an attitude of mechanical grasping as compared with the 
natural attitude of learning was studied by S. Aoki (2). A 
story was read to three groups of subjects. The first group 
was instructed to learn it mechanically, the second group to 
grasp the general meaning, and the third group to reproduce 
the contents in answer to four prepared questions. Aoki 
noted that reproduction was most difficult for group one, 
that group two grasped the material as a whole, and that 
group three did the best job of reproducing. From these 
results he concludes that analytical instruction is not 
effective because it results in an attitude of mechanical 
grasping of the material to be learned. 
~~ ______ ------------------------------------~1~7. 
--
Frances Wells (51) found in the course of an ex-
~ tensive study of affective experience that feeling varies 
markedly with the nature of the mental attitude or "set" which 
the subject adopts immediately before the stimulus is pre-
sented. This led her to study the effect of certain specific 
attitudes upon feeling. These attitudes were the critical 
affective, the critical perceptive, and the naive or common-
sense attitude. Three different groups of subjects were 
given three different sets of instructions. Group one re-
ceived general instructions requiring a description of the 
total experience from beginning to end. Group two received 
specific attitudinal instructions in which the subjects were 
required to adopt a particular observational attitude as de-
fined in the instructions. Group three received no instruc-
tions whatever. All subjects were asked to give an intro-
spective report. The effect upon reaction to the stimulus 
is reported in the case of each attitude. The results show 
that the attitude toward which one approaches an affective 
situation plays an important part in determining ones re-
action to it. The nature of the affective reaction varies 
widely under different attitudes. 
G. Meyers (33) studied the effect of the examination 
set on memory. His subjects were instructed to study for a 
particular kind of examination such as true-false, completion, 
multiple-choice or essay. He found that for recognition tests 
memory, set is of slight importance. For recog-
nition tests of delayed memory or for recall tests of ~mediate 
or delayed memory, recall sets are superior to recognition 
sets. For completion type of recall examination . set is 
superior throughout. For recall of facts in organized fashion, 
the essay type of examination is best. 
The work of H. Helson (18) i8 based upon the fact 
that mental sets have usually been attributed to their con-
nection with or effect upon past experience and association. 
This view, the author states, is expressed by D. Starch, who 
says, liThe particular meaning given a group of sensations is 
determined not only by the general uses of previous experi-
ences but also by the particular system of past associations 
dominant in the mind at the time; that is, meaning is deter-
mined by the present setting of the mind. II 
Helson's opinion is that when instructions evoke a 
response which has not been made in the past or one which 
would never have been expected on the basis of the subjects' 
past behavior, the theory which allows such factors as set or 
instructions merely to select or act in accordance with past 
experience is untenable. He thinks psychologists are prone 
to emphasize those cases in which past experience helps us in 
meeting new situations and to neglect the equally numerous 
cases in which past experience prevents us from making adequate 
adjustments to novel demands. Past exper1~ce and associations 
must be made effective by factors inhering within the situation 
confrpnting the organism or else they may fail to functton or 
may be a positive hindrance. 
To prove his position the author exposed normal 
playing cards and test cards (altered in various ways). The 
subjects were asked to name the card. Those who were very 
familiar with cards felt certain that they could not be wrong 
in reporting the card as belonging in a certain suit. In 
these cases past experience made it hard to see clearly and 
freshly what is novel in a situation. 
From his results Helson's conclusions are that 
instructions, calling for now one kind of activity, now 
another, determine the type and adequacy of the response more 
than do practice, richness of association, or past experience. 
This is explained by the fact that the instructions determine 
what resources the organism will use in solving its problems 
through their effect upon set and type of activity used. If 
past experience and associations are to be effective in de-
termining present responses', they must be organized, directed 
and set into action by the operation of some factor contained 
within the stimulus situation. 
Suggestion. 
Whether the mental set or attitude which one attempts 
to establish will modify the subjects'response, depends in 
~ ____ ----------------------________________________ ~2~0~.~ 
~ 
part upon the suggestibility of the subject. 
value of this suggestibility? 
What is the 
A. Vierkandt (50) in a paper which he calls, "New 
Views of the Nature of Suggestion," says that the popular idea 
of suggestion rests on two false assumptions. First, that 
man's normal behavior is rational, and second, t~at human 
beings are independent units making independent judgments and 
decisions. He says verbal suggestion is thought to consist in 
a sort of crippling of mental life. 
Vierkandt insists that in reality man is not an 
isolated rational creature. Verbal influence is natural and 
universal, not abnormal. From childhood man accepts without 
resistance the views of those around him. The child is un-
conditionally credulous. Only by experience does he learn 
to be critical. Even adults are critical only in a limited 
way. We accept the beliefs of a person we trust and think 
we are judging independently on rational grounds. He suggests 
abandoning the term suggestion for influence. 
A. Herzberg (20), who has made an analysis of sug-
gestion phenomena and the theory of suggestion, says that 
suggestions are not based on single unified mechanism, but 
arise from inter and contra action between very numerous and 
varied, partly inhibitory and partly favorable factors. These 
lie in the suggestee, in the suggestor, in the environment and 
in the content and type of reports by outsiders. 
r':· ___ ----------------------2l~. 
Those inherent in the suggestee are specific tend-
encies such as easy involy.em~ntof the sleep centers, special 
wishes, experiences, views, habits, and after-effects of 
experiences recently undergone. Such factors favor or hinder 
very definite attitudes and are thus specific content factors. 
Further we find the basic tendency to believe and obey, the 
emotional resonance, a desire for comradeship and subordination 
As inhibiting factors we find the instincts of aggression, 
avoidance, resistance and leadership. These determine the 
adoption or rejection of given attitudes. They are not 
specific but plastic. The habit of critical thought also 
acts as an inhibitory factor. 
There are three types of influence according to 
Herzberg. The first is directed toward critical thought and 
takes place through'. reason. The second takes place on the 
basis of specific tendencies, wishes and habits of the sug-
gestee. The third type, which is irrational, takes place. upon 
the basis of plastic factors. This last is suggestive only 
and on condition that it takes place in spite of the personal 
strivings, experiences, views B.nd habits of the recipient. 
The first type of influence mentioned by A. 
Herzberg is the kind which we hoped to exert upon the sub-
jects of the present experiment. Binet defines this in-
fluence or suggestion as obedience to a mental influence 
coming from another. 
,., 22. 
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Numerous studies have been made to determine the 
nature of suggestion and its effect upon reaction. .' These 
experiments have studied suggestibility in relation to motor 
reactions, or to sensations or beliefs. Only such as are in 
some manner related to the present study will be reviewed. 
As early as 1896 M. H. Small (46) experimented 
with children and found that two~undred-ninety-one out of 
three-hundred-eighty-one were affected by illusions of smell, 
of taste, and of sight. To produce the illusion of smell 
the experimenter sprayed water into the air and asked the 
children to write down the name of the perfume they smelled. 
For the illusion of taste he used sugar, salt And distilled 
water. A toy camel with a string around its neck was used 
for the illusion of sight. When a windlass was turned the 
camel seemed to be pulled, but in reality it remained sta-
tionary. Small concluded from the results of this study that 
suggestibility in children is a universal condition, very high 
in degree, and largely in control of those who know the child 
mind. 
The suggested effect of printed mottoes on the 
estimation of linear magnitude was investigated by J. Brand 
(9). His subjects were required to reproduce lines varying 
in length from twelve to thirty-four inches, which were 
represented by intervals between two pegs. The subject re-
produced the interval by spacing two smaller pegs on a ledge 
near him. The words "short ll and "long" were printed on cards 
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~ery rigid. The subject would then report a feeling of tight-
ening in his own hand. The second test was suggestion t y pro-
gressive lines. The subject had to say if one line .. was shorter 
or longer than the previous one. Suggestion by illusion of 
warmth was the third test used. Here the subject had to dis-
tinguish between the relative warmth of lamps held in each 
hand. The fourth test was the hand levitation test. The 
subject placed his hand palm down on the table and the ex-
perimenter placed his hand over it. He then gradually raises 
his hand from the subject's' a.nd suggests IIYour hand is light't, 
lilt is leaving the table. The fifth test is the suggestion 
by progressive weights, in which the subject must report the 
difference in weights after the first four. To induce a strong 
degree of suggestion the fidelity-of-report method was used. 
In this test two colored pictures were used and questions con-
cerning facts not found in the pictures were asked. The last 
test was contradictory suggestions as to lengths of lines made 
by the experimenter. 
In the course of the experiment Aveling and Hargreaves 
found that certain cases proved very suggestible to all tests, 
or nearly all, while others accepted practically no suggestions. 
This, they think, pOints to the fact that suggestibility is 
strongly marked in some subjects. 
Margaret Otis (38) says, "To accept a suggestion 
shows an absence of the ability to resist. It is a lack, a 
passive state. Resistance is something positive, is an 
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ability or trait and must correspond to the quality, number, 
~ 
or mode of functioning of the nerve cells and fibres of the 
nervous system. This ability is called by Binet auto-criticism, 
by Dewey self-confidence, by Woodworth good judgment and by 
Morgenthau planfulness. It is the ability to see the whole 
situation, instead of reaching to the most obvious part of it." 
Otis tested suggestibility in 1045 children in the 
preliminary test and 377 in the test proper. The Otis test 
is similar to the Army Alpha Tests. The author says that 
Binet furnished the spirit and the form of it. The tests in-
clude comparison of lines, twenty directions to be carried 
out, and true and false statements. Directions are given 
orally •. The suggestions are sometimes direct and sometimes 
indirect. For example, the directions might be, "Sixteen 
sentences will be read. Most of them are false. Draw a line 
under the word true, if the statement is true, and one under 
false, if it is false." Or the directions might be, "Here are 
some colors. Most people like green best. Draw a line under 
the color you like best." 
Two-thirds of the subjects in this experiment re-
sisted suggestion. From the testing, Otis concludes that 
there is a trait which may be called ability to resist sugges-
tion. The relation of this trait to general intelligence is 
high. It distinguishes the normal mind from the abnormal one. 
Chronological age is an important factor affecting resistance 
to suggestion. 
I. C. Sherman (44) made a study based upon. an ex-
periment tried with sixty children from six to sixteen 1ears 
old. Her aim was to find what effect verbal suggestion had 
upon perseverance in a task which has been given up as un-
solvable. A puzzle-box was placed before the subject, who 
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was told that by manipulating its three levers in the proper 
order the box could be .opened. Such suggestion as "I am sure 
you can get the box open," "You almost had it several times," 
were made. A child whose time on the second trial tended to 
be long in comparison with the first trial was regarded as 
more suggestible. From the results, the experimenter found 
that verbal suggestions were more effective with the youngest 
and oldest of the group, and less effective in the inter-
mediate ages. 
Varying types of experimental situations were used 
by R. S. White (52) in an endeavor to select some which would 
give a measure of a child's response to suggestive stimuli. 
One-hundred-thirty-six children of from three years to seven 
made up one control and two experimental groups. The experi-
mentrer found that most children are suggestible to a certain 
degree, although a few appear to be uninfluenced by a visual 
suggestibility of the type used. Negative suggestibility ~ 
rare. Suggestions similar to the child's own method of re-
action re-enfore his tendency and make opposing suggestions 
less effective. The extent to which the suggestions are 
followed depend upon their obviousness and the ease of per-
~Orming the movements involved. Children are not consistent 27. 
in their acceptence or rejection of suggestions. .. No sex dif-
ferences were apparent, but suggestibility increased slightly 
between the ages of three and seven. 
Four-hundred-four children were given the Margaret 
Otis test of suggestibility by E. S. Hurlock (21), and these 
scores were compared to scores made on the National Intelligence 
Test and with reference to race, age, and mental difference. 
In general, suggestibility of children appeared less than 
popularly supposed. White children were slightly superior to 
negro boys and girls in resistance to suggestion. Older 
children were superior to younger, and those of higher mental 
age to those of lower. These group difference, however, were 
small and unreliable. More striking differences appeared in 
individuals Of the same group. 
Problem Solving. 
The solution of a problem involves a typical process 
of thought. This process in many respects is similar to that 
used in the acquisition of scientific data. Numerous general 
discussions by authorities are av~ilable concerning the nature 
of the thought process as it relates to problem solving. 
One of the early authorities on scientific procedure 
is K. Pearson (39:46). ~ In discussing the nature of thought 
he says that the immediate sense-impression is to be looked 
upon as the spark which kindles thought, which brings into 
play the still remaining impresses of past sense-impressions. 
These stored impressions are linked together in so many wa~ 
that we are not able to recognize the relation between an 
immediate sense-impression and the resulting train of thought. 
Nor can we trace back a train of thought to the immediate 
sense-impression from which it starts. Yet the elements of 
thought are certainly the permanent impresses of past sens~ 
impressions, and thought is started by immediate sense-
impressions. Thought once excited, the mind passes from one 
stored impression to another. It classifies these impressions, 
analyzes or simplifies their characteristics and forms general 
notions of properties and modes. Thought then passes from 
perceiving to conceiving. 
The amount of mental association in our individual 
selves depends on the variety and extent of our stored im-
pressions, or on the individual capacity for thinking, or on 
the form and development of the brain. The same type of brain 
receives the same sense-impressions and forms the same "con-
structs". Two normal perceptive faculities construct prac-
tically the same universe. The universal validity of science 
depends upon the similarity of the perceptive and reasoning 
faculties in normal civilized men. 
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Science is in reality a classification and analysis 
of the contents of the mind; and the scientific method~on­
sists in drawing comparisons and inferences from the stored 
impresses of past sense-impressions and from the conception 
based upon them. 
In order that a conception may have scientific 
validity it must be self-consistent and deducible from the 
perceptions of the normal human being. Inference follows 
perception and when scientifically valid is one that could be 
drawn by every logically trained normal mind were it in pos-
session of the conceptions upon which the inference has been 
based. 
Watt in speaking of the problem or "aufgabe" says 
an act of thought is a sequence of experiences whose procession 
from its first term, the stimulus, has been determined by a 
psychological factor (that is by the problem). As a con-
scious experience this psychological factor is past and gone, 
but it still persists as an appreciable influence. 
Ach agrees with Watt. He says that the observer's 
consciouness during the fore period is dominated by a purpose. 
The idea ot end subexcites its correlated reproductive 
tendencies, and is therefore accompanied by awareness of 
meaning. The tendencies so aroused are further brought into 
relation with the idea of object, which they acoordingly in-
fluence in the sense of the idea of end. The establishment 
of these relations between idea of end and idea of object 
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he terms a purpose. 
John Dewey (11:68) says that the problem fixae the 
end, afthought, and the end controls the process of thinking. 
He defines problem as, "the discovery of intervening terms, 
which when inserted between the remoter end and the given 
means will harmonize them with each other." 
The difficulty resides in the conflict between 
conditions at hand and a desired and intended result, between 
an end and the means of reaching it. The object of thinking 
is to introduce congruity between the two. 
The third step in the solution of a problem, 
according to Dewey, is a suggestion of a possible solution. 
Regarding this step, he says that suspended belief depends 
on the presence of rival conjectures as to the best course to 
pursue. Because of this, cultivation of a variety of alter-
native suggestions i·s an impDrtant factor in good thinking. 
The fourth step is the development by reasoning of 
the bearings of the suggestion. The process of developing 
the implications of any idea with respect to any problem 
Dewey calls reasoning. Reasoning sets out from an idea and 
develops the idea to a form more apposite to the problem even 
if it does lead to rejection. The development of an idea 
through reasoning helps at least to supply the intervening 
terms that link together into a consistent whole apparently 
discrepant extremes. 
Further observation and experiment leads to the 
acceptance or rejection of the development of the impl~cation 
of the suggestion. If experimental results agree with the 
theoretically or rationally deduced results, the confirmation 
is so strong as to induce a conclusion. 
Johannes Lindworsky, S. J., (26:264) discusses 
problem solving under the head of productive thinking. He 
pOints to Selz who has proven that a presented task does not 
make all possible associated images appear with the task 
stimulus. Individual images do not emerge unconnected, but 
instead they call into conscioUBness the methodical procedure 
which we earlier learned to apply to the solution of the task. 
The image of the procedure operates as an anticipating schema, 
and this furnishes us not with something diffuse, but rather 
with servicable images which form a complex schema. This 
complex is compared with the task, and if by an apprehensiom 
of relation its agreement with the task is recognized, it 
becomes accepted; otherwise, a further methodical search is 
made. 
In general, for Lindworsky, we are concerned with 
bringing together the means and the goal. He gives O. Selz1s 
four possible instances: (1) The goal to be attained and the 
means leading to the goal can be recognized and be present in 
the thinker's consciousness. Material relations, that is to 
say, reproduction of a complex, are the chief considerations 
here. (2) If the goal is given, and a means of obtaining its 
purpose is still unrecognized, by means of reproductions of 
~ 
complexes, various means are called to memory, which can if 
need be, come into consideration, and those are tested in-
dividually as to their fitness. A conclusion releases 'us from 
the domination of association, although the emergence of the 
conclusion very frequently depends upon the associative con-
ditions. (3) If our memory does not include useful means, we 
are dependent upon the favor of chance. In this case, as be-
fore, we consider all things from the standpoint of their suit-
ability for our pur.pose. (4) Finally, a means and its end 
can be offered to us accidentaly as something real, but not 
as something for which we strive. 
Lindworsky concludes that complex completion, ap-
prehension of relation, and volitional processes, are the 
three factors which bring direction, arrangement and abbrevi-
ation into productive thinking. If, without both the latter 
factors, or with only elementary aSSOCiations, we wished to 
comprehend something, it would be absolutely impossible. 
Regarding problem solving, Thorndike (49:159) thinks 
there is co-operative action of many connections. Under the 
guidance of some mental set many tendencies start working. 
Some of the responses produced thereby are discarded altogether; 
some are put aside to be given influence later; some are used 
together to determine the next step. As thinking progresses 
each of its constituent responses is subject to certification 
or validation. 
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Thorndike defines correct thinking as the right 
.' weighing of elements, held in the right relations and con-
nected with the right associations. He says wrong thinking 
results when the process of validating is too easy-going to 
detect and correct the mistakes made in attaching weight to 
elements, putting them in relation and having them evoke 
right associations. 
Charles H. Judd (23:169) describes the problem in 
the following manner. In a new situation, the first impression 
is a vague, somewhat confused view, including in a loose ag-
gregation a large number of items. The eye rests on one item 
after another and the observer cultivates discriminating 
familiarity with the details of various objects. After 
analysis has made the mind familiar with certain items, a 
process of organizing synthesis begins. In the third stage 
of experience, the observer sees in their proper relations 
the objects that make up the whole. Each object takes its 
place as part of the whole and yet retains its individuali~. 
This is the stage of true comprehension. Analysis and insight 
into relations make a thing understandable. 
H. Gruender, S. J., (14:328) develops fully the 
scientific method as it may be applied to the problem of the 
thought processes. The first step, he says, is the preliminary 
observation. The second step in the method is the formulation 
of a tentative hypothesis. The third step in the inductive 
method is deductive reasoning. The fourth and last step is 
verification of the conclusions drawn from our hypothesis. 
~ 
The last step is performed by comparing these conclusions or 
"expectations" with the facts already collected in the first 
step. If the data there obtained is insufficient for a com-
plete verification of our conclusions, we must plan a new set 
of experiments and go back to the laboratory for further re-
search. Thus we may succeed in the complete verification of 
our hypothesis. 
It is well, however, this same author warns, not to 
be too hasty in proclaiming our hypothesis established. The 
conclusions deduced from rival hypotheses must also be tested 
in a similar manner. On doing this, we may find that at ~st 
some facts agree just as well with the hypothesis of others as 
with our own. This indicates the ~ed for further research. 
The same is true when we find that many of the facts are in 
agreement with our hypothesis but others are not. Then some 
change in our hypothesis must be made to meet these difficul-
ties, and thus we must go over agalnthe work of the second, 
third and fourth steps. Only when all the facts ascertained 
are in agreement with our hypothesis, and all rival hypotheses 
plainly fail to meet their difficulties, have we assurance 
that our hypothesis plainly is the true explanation of the 
facts observed. Then our hypothesis becomes a general prop-
osition concerning the nature of the object which we have been 
investigating. 
~~ ________________________________ 3e~. 
Victor H. Noll (35) has contributed a very complete 
exposition of the habit of scientific thinking and its Jmport-
ance in the life of the average human being. He claims tha~ 
present-day troubles and ills are caused by false, prejudiced 
and generally unscientific thinking. The orgy of speculation, 
get-rich-quick schemes, harmful beauty aids and quack remedies 
are due to unscientific thinking. Our social organization, 
our political machinery, our economic structure, and our 
educational system are unsatisfactory and unstable for the 
same reasons. 
One of our major objectives of education is, he says, 
the development of attitudes, because as emotionalized re-
action patterns they are strong motivating factors. Our 
attitudes toward home, toward social and political institu-
tions, toward the natural environm~~and toward the achieve-
ments of science, determine much of what we do and how we act. 
Attitudes are based on hsbits of thinking. They are more or 
less automatic, depending upon how deeply they have been 
planted. They are constant to the same situation; they are 
acquired, not inherited, and they may be modified through 
experience. 
Because attitudes cannot be observed directly but 
on,ly in their manifestation in behavior, the writer gives a 
subjective analysis of the scientific thinking attitude. 
He assigns six fundamental habits to thinking 
scientifically. The first is the habit of accuracy in all 
36. 
operations. This habit is necessary in all high-grade scien-
.. 
tific research, but is no less desirable in everyday life. 
The second is the habit of intellectual honesty. This in-
cludes sticking to facts, B.nd refraining from exaggeration. 
It involves submerging personal bias and prejudice. The 
third is the habit of open-mindedness. This includes constant 
revision and editing of opinions and conclusions through the 
reception and accumulation of additional data, and is most 
adB.pted to scientific research. The habit of suspended jucg-
ment is the fourth fundamental habit of scientific thinking, 
This implies the habit of actually lookimg for new facts and 
waiting for all available ones before coming to a final con-
clusion. This habit seems especially dependent upon mental 
maturity for its development. He says that children are 
notably prone to jump to conclusions without sufficient facts 
to substantiate them. The fifth habit is the habitual search 
for true cause-and-effect relationships. It indicates a 
functioning connection of the universal Operation of the law 
of cause and effect. The habit of critiCism, including self-
criticism, is the final habit necessary to scientific think-
ing. This includes looking at suggested explanations, natural 
occurrences, and proposed remedies with a critical eye. It 
does not mean fault-finding, but the habit of exercising all 
the powers of careful judgment and evaluation. 
Noll presents the possible objection that the habits 
of thinking just analyzed are those to be expected of the 
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trained scientist and not the average person. He answers the 
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objection with the statement that in their highest state of 
refinement this may be true, but it is necessary for the 
average person to acquire each of these habits in amounts 
substantial enough to make them function in everyd~y life. 
In a second paper Noll (36) discusses teaching the 
habit of scientific thinking. He repeats that these habits 
are important in the everyday life and thinking, not only of 
the scientist, but of everyone. Then development in a grea~er 
degree than now exists in every individual would go far, he 
thinks, toward the attainment of a more satisfactory adjust-
ment of economic, political, and social problems than we have 
yet been able to effect. 
This author says that experience has shown the 
futility of exhortation and admonition. Materials and methods 
of instruction must be organized definitely for this purpose. 
He suggests the collaboration of teachers of natural science 
and teachers of social science as an attack upon unscientific 
thinking in the field of social situations. 
Concerning the method to be used, Noll says that 
no one method is peculiarly and solely appropriate for the 
teaching of scientific habits of thinking. No method of 
itself will guarantee the attainment of a goal, unless the 
goal is made the objective of that method. 
The six habits of thinking, the author says, should 
be taught directly as such. There is no reason for leaving 
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SO important an objective to chance. Practice must be given 
.' in the formation of these habits in specific situations, anft 
in all possible situations. They should be generalized and 
made meaningful and desirable to the pupil to insure effic~ncy 
and permanepc,. of learning. This latter aim can be accomplished 
without cheapening these values in the least, if we use the 
material at hand in an intelligent way. As an example of how 
this might be done, Noll suggests a study of present-day heroes 
and heroines such as Edison or Earhart. The importance of 
habits of scientific thinking as a factor in their success 
could be used as a motiv~ting influence. 
The study of the problem from an experimental 
standpoint has demonstrated the validity of theoretical 
writings on the subject. The conclusions of Edgar J. Swift 
(47) concerning the psychology of learning, though not on 
that of the problem as such, are significant in the light of 
our present study. He found in teaching children to throw a 
ball, that to children future benefit is at least a poor 
recompense for present misery. Remote interests often count 
for very little with children. He discovered, also, that the 
suggestion o~la good way to do a thing'saves time, but must 
be made when the learner feels the need for them. Overstrained 
attention is a hindrance rather than a help. 
Henry Ruger (42) questions one of the findings of 
Swift, who maintains that variations in method are most ef~ct­
ive when they are not attended to. In Ruger's experiments 
"'.lth solving mechanical puzzles there seemed to be a natural 39. 
tendency to vary which could be hindered or favored in v~ious 
waYS. 
Of special significance in the determination of the 
occurrence of variations in the puzzle experi~ents was the 
personal attitude of the subject. Two unfavorable attitudes 
were noted; the submissive, or suggestible, and the self-
attentive. 
The suggestible attitude was very marked in two of 
Ruger's subjects. These subjects seemed to be especially 
sensitive toward any movement of the experimenter which might 
give an indication as to the course to be pursued. In such 
cases there is a lack of confidence in the self, but the 
attention is directed not to the self but to some other person. 
The suggestions of the other person are accepted uncritically. 
This attitude and the self-attentive attitude are not favorable 
to efficiency. 
A third attitude, which rtuger says increases in 
dealing with novel situations., is what he terms the problem 
attitude. This is one of self-confidence as opposed to the 
self-distrust of the other two attitudes. This self-confidence 
is expressed in a high level of intellectual activity and 
attention. Attention is directed to the thing to be done 
rather than to self. This attitude is accompanied by a com-
pensating tendency toward critical evaluation of variations, 
a flexible holding of assumptions and suggestions, and a 
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rigid testing of them. These various factors entering into 
.' this attitude were noted by Ruger to be connected with ef-
ficient forms of response. The ideal of efficiency, he says, 
involves the active search for methods of control. 
In 1918 John P. Herring (19) attempted to measure 
some abilities in scientific thinking. He was motivated to 
this study by the conviction that civilized society needs 
more scientific thinking. His ultimate aim was to focus 
attention sharply upon scientific method as the proper method 
of children's study both in the ten abilities tested, and in 
all other abilities which are not important or feasible. His 
immediate aim was to increase the consciousness and effective-
ness of the use of ten scientific abilities. Regarding the 
first aim, Herring says that we must teach children how to 
study, to handle problems, to work methodically. 
This investigator names ten abilities which are 
necessary in the scientific solution of problems. These are 
the ability to judge the relative value of different problems, 
the ability to judge whether a problem can or cannot be solved, 
the ability to distinguish a good definition from a bad one in 
defining the terms of a problem, the ability to locate ambiguit~, 
to know when statistics are needed in proof of a statement .. or 
in the solution of a problem, to select facts that relate to 
the problem, to distinguish good from bad comparison, to rec-
ognize the presence of something foreign in a class, to arnange 
the members of a class in useful sequence, and to judge if 
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data is sufficient for the purpose. 
.' Herring tested eighteen hundred grade pupils. To 
these he presented statements whose answers tested the various 
abilities just mentioned. The author concludes that in the 
past too much emphasis has been placed on measuring the content 
of the different subjects studied. He suggests that while ~the 
measurement of scientific ability is set with difficulty, 
still it is dealing not mainly with memory, nor addition, 
nor spelling, nor punctuation, important as these are, but 
with the noblest intellectual function, judgment. 
Thomas Russell Garth (13) made a study related to 
that of Ruger's which demonstrated the use of the method of 
trial-and-error in solving problems. In Ruger's experiment 
the elements were largely physical, while in the case of the 
riddle experiment conducted by Garth, the elements were memal. 
Garth's aim was to show the similarity and possible' identity 
which is brought out on a comparison of the method used in 
riddle solving and the method used in learning by trial-and-
error. He selected ten riddles such as, "If your aunt's 
sister is not your aunt, then what kin is she to you?" 
From the results obtained Garth concludes that one 
must believe in the trial-and-error character of the method 
employed in riddle solution. Speedy guessing tends to militate 
against success and rare associations characterize this kini 
of guessing. Too slow a speed in guessing also results in 




In the early stages of learning, according to 
Petersen, those elements which occurred most frequentl~in 
closest temporal contiguity were generally the first to be 
combined in higher units. Certain situation and response 
elements which occurred most often and in closest proximity 
to other elements became so closely associated with the latter 
as to serve as symbols through which the various elements were 
co-ordinated and their subsequent recall much facilitated. 
In the latter stages of learning, symbols repre-
senting well arranged con~epts were called in by associatian. 
Through the medium of these symbols, and again by means of 
specific associations, meanings were transferred from pre-
viously known to newly discovered elements. Association of 
this sort at first functioned slowly and imperfectly, but 
continued repetition brought about a facility and even aut~ 
maticity of functioning comparable to that of sensori-motor 
co-ordinations. 
Edna Heidbreder (16) conducted an investigation of 
the thinking process. She constructed a test to fit the 
assumption that thinking is an activity, which by some means 
other than overt motor reaction, produces responses which 
are adequate, novel and invented. It consisted in marking 
geometrical figures according to instructions. 
She divided the behavior of the subjects into 
participant and spectator behavior. In spectator behavior 
there 1s action without any hypothesis being tried out. In 
participant behavior the subject tries out a hypothesis. 
Spectator behavior is accompanied by general ~­
servational activity during which the organism is set for 
registering impressions. A secondary form of this behavior 
is found when the subject is more definitely aware of what 
is going on. He makes an effort to focus his observations. 
He may use a hypothesis he knows is wrong but one which has 
given some success, trying to find wherein it is right or 
wrong. A third form of spectator behavior Heidbreder calls 
the momentary form. The subject falls into this form for a 
single reaction. He thus becomes absorbed in an activity not 
directly connected with the overt reaction, and, as a result, 
the two lines of conduct become dlsa:,g'socla.ted. This last is 
typical of spectator behavior in general in the sense that 
the overt activity does not represent the main activity. 
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Spectator behavior may be characterized best as 
primarily a cessation of participant activity when no hypoth-
esis is ava1lable, and secondarily, a state of affairs which 
may fac1litate processes of summ~t1on. It is a distant general 
attitude toward the problem. It may function as a preparatory 
reaction to the process of ' summation, which in turn may supply 
the raw material for new theories of action. 
Heidbreder says the general function of analysis in 
problem solving seems to be to reduce the supply of content 
by singling out possible significant features; that is, recur-
ring features, new or different features, features to which 
the organism has been in the habit of responding, and features 
associated with success or failure. 
Concerning synthesis, she says it is most likely 
to occur when the subject is facing a new situation, either 
when he is making his first response to a problem, or when he 
is making a fresh start in its solution. Synthesis results 
in the production of higher units of various orders and the 
selection of relevant material by means of mental sets. 
This investigator says that new responses may occur 
as the result of observation, summation, removal of inter-
ference, clues, generalization, and "thinking out ll the 
solution. She finds good evidence for the production of 
new responses through the summation of impressions not 
specifically attended to. Thls suggests a possible function 
of spectator behavior. 
The solution of a problem is, according to 
Heidbreder, a very definite event in a subject's activity in 
spite of the fact that it is not effected by any special 
process or group of processes. She gives nine methods of 
reaching a solution to a problem. These are by cleavage 
responses, plus participant variations, by participant 
variations alone, by deliberate analysis, by simply occurring, 
by clues, by summation, by a generalization of two general-
izations, by original search and by convergence of two re-
sponses. 

a more subjective to a more objective attitude toward the 
problems as a whole. Four-year-olds responded totally ~o 
the problem situation. 
Augusta Alpert (1) investigated the solving of 
problems by pre-school children after the manner of Koehler. 
She hung a toy balloon out of reach and varied the means by 
which the child could secure the toy. A hollow block, a 
chair, and a box could be used to solve the problem. 
Concerning insight into a problem, Alpert says 
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that the subject gains insight when a change occurs in him 
which caused the material in hand to undergo a definite change 
from a disorganized, meaningless mass, to an organized mean-
ingful arrrangement of parts. When this happens, the subject 
is said to have insight. The solution itself thus becomes 
the criterion of insight. The moment of insight may be 
sudden, or a glimmering apprehension, and is found in all 
degrees from elusive and indefinite dimness to clear and 
convincing definiteness. 
This investigator found eight factors responsible 
individually or in combination for the partial or complete 
inhibition of insight which effect the solving process. Self-
consciousness decreases attention to the problem. It imposes 
motor inhibition and mental inhibitions, so that even when 
insight is present it is prevented from consummating in 
action. Lack of confidence interferes with the maturing of 
insight. The extent to which the subjects allow anyone 
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"mind set" to usurp their attention, to just that extent do 
they lessen the chances of seeing the problem in the ri~ht 
perspective. This !lmind set" Alpert terms "fixations". Lack 
of interest, discouragement, and excitability are'unfavorable 
to insight because attention is diverted from the problem. 
Lack of observation and emotional immaturity results in 
little or no activity. 
The general conclusions from the study are that 
problem-solving-activity is determined by the nature of the 
problem situation. It is trial-and-error, or deliberate, 
accordint; to the set-up. Exploration and elimination was the 
most frequent response and yielded the greatest number of 
solutions. Solution is arrived at only when insight is 
gained. No solution results from chance. Arousal of insight 
and its consummation in solution are fa.vored by emotional, 
temperamental, and mental factors. 
A study of overt trial-and-error in problem solving 
of pre-school children was made by Genevieve L •. Harter (15). 
Her aim was to determine the ability of pre-school children 
to solve a problem situation without overt trial-and-error. 
Each test involved a solution in which one step or stage of 
the process must be completed before the succeeding step. 
The first step was the obstacle peg test, in which the subject 
had to fit pegs into grooves. The canal-box test required 
the subject to get a baIlout of a box through a hidden 
door. 
Finally, a pulley test was given. 
pulley was a box containing a top. 
At the farthest end of the 
,. 
This could be reached by 
screwing two sticks together, which were lying near the sub-
ject. 
Harter concludes that pre-school children exhibit 
considerable overt trial-and-error in solving problems. The 
suooessful were older chronologically and mentally. The 
number of randon moves were reduced on the seoond trial. Those 
who sucoeeded made fewer moves than those who failed. How-
ever, the failure group had a longer time in whioh to make 
moves than the suooessful group, who were limited by the 
solution. 
Norman R. Maier (28) investigated the solution of 
a problem and its appearance in oonsciousness. He gave his 
subjects the task of solving a problem having four possible 
solutions. Two oords hung from the oeiling and reached the 
floor. One hung near a wall and the other from the center 
of the room. The direotions were to tie the two ends to-
. 
gether. Anything in the room could be used that would help 
in the solution of the problem. The subject had to solve. 
the problem in four different ways. Trials were timed and 
introspective reports given concerning the means of solution. 
Maier's results lead him to believe that the per-
ception of the solution of a problem is like the perceiving 
of the solution of a hidden figure in a puzzle picture. In 
both cas~s the perception is su4den, there is no oonscious 
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intermediate stage, and the relationship of the elements in 
.' the final perception are different than those which preceded •. 
Changes in meaning are involved. The manner in which one 
tries to solve a problem, that is, the reasoner's direction, 
is dependent on what he sees the difficulty to be. 
When a person attempts to solve a problem,Maier 
says, he sees the difficulty to be of a certain sort. Past 
experiences are then organized in such a way as to overcome 
this difficulty. Behavior or lines of thought which are 
directed at the overcoming of a certain difficulty may be 
characterized as the "direction" in which a person is think-
ing. Only when the direction in thinking was an attempt to 
overcome the correct difficulty were suggestions successfully 
used. "Directions" thus determine which experiences will be 
facilitated and which will be blocked or inhibited. 
The "direction" set up when a person is trying to 
solve a problem seems to be a field of strain, according to 
Maier. The field of strain determines the organization of 
experiences, and must inhibit certain past experiences and 
facilitate others. 
In reasoning, this fisl~ of strain is set up by the 
desire to solve the problem, and the knowledge of the end, the 
attainment of which offers certain difficulties. Whether or 
not a problem is to be solved depends on whether the field 
of strain is adequate; that is, whether the individual is 
trying to overcome a practical difficulty and whether a 
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certain combination of parts of past experiences will result 
when the field of stra.in is adequate. .' 
In a second experiment Maier (29) attempted to dis-
cover whether habitual activity actually inhibits the formation 
of the solution of a problem, or whether such activity merely 
comes in when there is nothing else to do. To one group of 
individuals he gave the suggestion to try and rid themselves 
of persistent habits and direction in their thinking and to 
maintain an attitude of receptiveness for new approaches to 
the problem. A second group were nqt given the suggestion. 
Group one were significantly better at problem solving than 
group two. 
Maier says that these results indicate that reason-
mg involves the inhibition of persisting habits 8.S well as 
the ability to form solution-patterns. 
An experimental study of insight is reported by 
Y. Kubo (24). Eleven experiments of maze running and problem 
solving were selected and arranged, from one that could be 
done by mere trial-and-error procedure, to one that could 
not be done without insight. 
The results showed that insight in man is much more 
complex than in animals. Human behavior is guided no·t only 
by insight in the narrow sense of grasping of essential re-
lations, but also by foresight. Problem solution in man may 
be analyzed into ten steps. These steps are similar to those 
mentioned by previous investigators. Success or failure, 
quickness or slowness, and exactness or not solving, depends 
on the observer's intell~gence and experience. Moreov~r, 
the attitude and the character of the observer have great 
effect on the solution. 
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Victor H. Noll (37), whose contributions to the 
subject of the scientific attitude have already been reported, 
assumed that the results of training in scientific thinking 
could be measured. He proposed to measure the extent to 
which scientific thinking functions, not entirely or even 
predominantly in the laboratory, but in life situations, 
and in terms of common experience. 
On this basis, tests were constructed to test the 
six habits of scientific thinking enumerated by him in a 
previous paper. For example, the test for accuracy consisted 
in answering questions concerning the Earth and Mars from an 
accurate observation of a diagram of these two planets. The 
rest of the test was a true-and-false test, each statement 
of which tested one of the remaining five habits of scien-
tific thinking. 
The tests were given to three-hundred-eighty-three 
boys and girls in grades eight to twelve. The results showed 
that thinking becomes more scientific as children mature. Even 
the high scores are not advanced enough in scientific thinking. 
As recent as 1936 Norman H. F. Maier (30) conducted 
an experiment in problem solving by pre-school children. His 
aim was to determine to what extent children are capable of 
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reorganizing their experiences; that is, integrating or com-
bining isolated experiences. 4' 
Booths were placed at the ends of pathways arranged 
in the form of a swastika. One of the booths contained a toy 
wind-mill house. When a penny was dropped in the chimney, 
the house would play a tune. The child was conducted to this 
booth in the first part of the experiment. In the second 
part, he was told to find the wind-mill house after having 
been started from a different booth. The child's response 
was regarded as correct if he entered no wrong alleys beyond 
the elbow turn. 
Sixty-one and five tenths per cent demonstrated 
ability to recognize pe.st experiences. Sex was unimportant. 
The ability to recognize past experience did not become 
marked until about seventy months of age, when over seventy 
per cent of the children demonstrated the capacity. 
Maie~ considers these results only a preliminary 
survey. They shOW, however, that ability to combine the 
essentials of two isolated experiences so as to reach a goal 
is rather late in maturing. The ability matures at widely 
different ages, and the time of its appearance is related to , 
mental age. The results support the contention that the 
ability to reorganize past experiences to form new combinations 
is independent of the ability to form associations. When the 
former ability becomes functional, we should expect more orig-
inality and les8 sterotypy. Increasing age should cause the 
r __ ----------------------------------------------~5~4~. 
originality factor to become more and more dominant. 
When the various posit10ns taken by the auth01s 
reviewed on the subject of the process of thought 1nvolved 
in problem solving are summed up, a lack of uniform1ty be-
comes apparent. Some of thwse authors formulate a definite 
number of steps which they imply necessarily belong to every 
act of problem solving. Others declare that no special 
process, or combination of processes, is necessarily 1nvolved 
in the solution of a proble~. Still other investigators in 
this field hold to a theory that contains a certain factor, 
which is presented as the essential or most important element 
in the thought process. These factors are association of 
past sense-impressions, trial-and-error, perception of re-
lations, relating means to goal, attitude and character. Very 
often these factors are not well defined and their exact 
funct10n 1s not made clearly discernible. 
The associationists place elementary associations 
foremost in thinking. They claim that the whole mental life 
of man, the most abstract reasoning included, is the result 
of the combination, liberation, and substitution of mental 
elements, and thse elements are sensations and images. This 
theory ignores or reduces to a sensory-level-process the ap-
prehension of relations and the volitional processes which 
other writers say are also necessary to efficient thinking. 
These two latter factors involve knowledge which is not the 
immediate effect of sensible objects acting on the senses, 
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but which a matter of intellectual interpretation. 
Those who hold trial-and-error as the princiPhl 
element of the thought process insist that impulsive, hit-
or-miss action in a situation of which the subject understands 
nothing, leads to correct solution of problems. They depend 
on a lucky accident which they say leads to insight into the 
problem. These writers fail to account for what happens 
immediately after the lucky accident. They neglect to mention 
such facts as direction of attention, the testing of repro-
duced complexes as to their suitability, the recognition of 
the terms of the relations, and the perception of relations. 
Then there are the authors who insist upon some-
thing more than elementary association or trial-and-error as 
factors in comprehension. They declare that images do not 
appear unconnected when the task is presented. Instead they 
call into aD~ousness images that form a complex schema. 
This they say is only one step in the total process. This 
complex schema is compared with the task, and if by appre-
hension of relations its agreement with the task is recognized, 
it becomes accepted; otherwise, a further methodical search 
is made. As to trial-and-error, they admit that when our 
memory does not include useful means we are dependent upon 
chance, but in this case, also, all things are considered 




The preliminary work leading up to the experiment 
proper consisted first in getting two problems that actually 
required planning for their solution. The color-box evolved 
from a problem in which varied colored paper cut into different 
lengths and thickness was used. In this problem the subject 
was required to arrange these fifty pieces of paper in the best 
possible order. It soon became evident that the paper slips 
would be impractical' when used by sixty children. The round 
• 
wooden sticks were found to be satisfactory. The colors of 
the sticks now had to be determined. Red was thought to be 
unwise, because of the possibility of color-blfndness inter-
fering with the problem. Blue, white, lemon and orange were 
finally decided upon. The sticks were given three coats of 
enamel. When they become sOiled from use they can be wB,shed 
and restored to their original color. NOW, the next task 
was to devise a series of boxes into which to arrange the 
sticks. Small card-board boxes were first glued together on 
a flat surface. After experimenting with these, it was dis-
covered that too much time was consumed in removing the sticks 
from this type of box. The concave wooden box was then found 
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to do away with this difficulty. The fingers fitted into the 
box easily and the sticks could be removed without diffJculty. 
The problem was then presented to sixteen children 
who were not used in the actual experiment. From the perform-
ance of these subjects, a basis of scoring the color-box was 
obtained. 
The time limit arrived at for the color-box was ten 
minutes. This approximated the median of the sixteen scores 
for the color-box. A bonus of five pOints was allowed for 
each minute under ten. Because the average number of trials 
for the sixteen cases was approximately two and one half, a 
penalty of five points was assessed for trials over two. From 
the fact that seven subjects out of sixteen made less than 
thirty moves, and one made an even thirty, one half point 
for each move over thirty was judged to be a fair penalty. 
The errors made by the sixteen subjects in the pre-
liminary study established a basis for scoring the actual 
performance on t~e color box. Failure to arrange the sticks 
in correct rows occurred fourteen times. Failure to arrange 
them according to thickness happened six times, and according 
to color four times. From these results, the relative dif-
ficulty of the various steps in the solution of the problem 
was apparent. Ten points were deducted for failure to arrange 
the sticks according to rows, twenty points for failure to 
arrange them according to thickness, tfutrty points for color 
and forty for length. 
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The preliminary work that resulted in the con-
struction of the bird-house began with an experiment in .' 
which a toy doll-house was used. The problem consisted in 
constructing the house out of several separate walls. This 
problem was given to several subjects to solve before its de-
ficiencie.s tor the purpose in mind was noted. One of these 
was that while it was difficult to put together, it did not 
require definite steps for its solution. It was feared that 
some subjects might be farnilar with the house as it was a 
popular toy sold by a well known manufacturer. Both of these 
obstacles were overcome by the construction of the bird-house 
used in the experiment proper. Its special features make it 
unfarnilar, and definite steps are necessary for its correct 
construction. This problem was presented to the same sixteen 
subjects and the procedure described for the color-box was 
followed. A time limit of twenty minutes was set on the 
construction of the bird-house, since this approximated the 
median of the sixteen subjects completing this problem. A 
bonus of one half point for each minute under twenty was also 
given. 
A summary of the errors shows fourteen failures to 
place the inside nut in position. The perch was put under 
the house five times and on top of the house three times. It 
was also put in the wrong hole once and turned over twice. The 
rod was reversed eight times. Eleven subjects out of sixteen 
had trouble with the perch, rod and inside nut. From these 
results, it was decided to deduct ten points when the perch 
was not screwed down, twenty pOints if it was put under~he 
house and thirty if it was put on top. For all other minor 
errors, five pOints were deducted, and for unforeseen major 
errors ten pOints were deducted. 
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In the experiment proper these two problems were 
presented to sixty children to solve. These sixty subjects 
were divided into two groups, a control and an experimental 
group. The individuals in the control group were then paired 
with those in the experimental group for age, sex and I. Q., 
in order to eliminate these factors as explanatory of perform-
ance. 
To secure as accurate a pairing as pOSSible, the 
Kuhlman-Anderson Test, Fourth Edition, Grade Six, end Grades 
Seven and Eight, were given. The average I. Q. for the girls 
in the control group was 101, and in the experimental group 
100. For the boysl control group the average I. Q. was 101, 
and for the experimental group 102. The average mental age 
for the boys and girls of each group was twelve years. 
In order to secure a measure of planfulness, the 
Porteus Test, Vineland Revision, and Kohs' Block Design Tests 
were administered. These last two tests were selected because 
they seemed best fitted to evaluate planning capacity. The 
scores of all three tests were then averaged. Although this 
average score cannot be called an intelligent quotient, it 
does give an average measure of the factors which we have 
tried to control in the pairing of our subjects. The scores 
of the three tests and the resulting pairing are shown fn 
tables one and two. 
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Each individual of both the control and the ex-
perimental group was given the same problems to solve. These 
problems were chosen because they required definite steps to 
be followed in their solution, and planning these steps im-
proved the performance. A record was kept of the time by 
means of a stop-watch. The number of trials and the number 
of moves were also recorded. To facilitate the scoring, a, 
move was recorded when one of the five sticks of any certain 
length, color and thickness was put in or taken out of a box. 
The placing of the remainirgfour sticks of the same length, 
color and thickness were not considered 8S moves. In each 
case a qualitative description was attempted from the obser-
vable performance of the subjects. Standard instructions, 
procedure, and scoring were followed in order to reduce the 
usual variables found in all experimental and test situations. 
Both groups received the same instructions, with one exception. 
The experimental group received explicit instructions to plan 
the tasks, which were preceded by a brief instruction on the 
value of planning~ This procedure was not followed in the 
case of'the control group. 
The first problem consisted in arranging fifty 
sticks of different lengths, thickness and colors in ten boxes, 
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The empty boxes were placed before the subject as 
shown in the photograph. The fifty sticks were thorough11 
mixed in the cover of the box and placed conveniently near. 
The following instructions were then given:-
COlor-Box Instructions for Control Group. 
Here is a stunt for you to do. It is just hard 
enough to ~e fun. Arrange these sticks in the boxes in the 
best possible order. There are different ways of doing it, 
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but only one way is the best possible order. Arranging things 
in order, means putting them where they belong. If a boy ODmes 
home from school and throws his books in the coal bin, his coat 
under the bed and his galoshes on the table, we would not fray 
he was orderly. But, if he set his books on the table, hung 
his coat on a hook, and left his galoshes out in the hall, we 
would call him a 'tTery orderly boy, because he had put each 
thing in its proper place. 
This is just what you are to do here. Put each 
stick in its proper place. 
Color-Box Instructions for Experimental Group. 
Here is a stunt for you to do. It is just hard 
enough to be fun. Arrange these sticks in these boxes in the 
best possible order. Before you try it, make a plan of work 
for yourself. You will do it much better and quicker, if you 
do. 
Planning helps everybody. It saves them time and 
labor. Your mother has to plan what she will need to buy 
before she goes to the store. When you are going to a picnic, 
you make plans about who will bring the lunch and when and 
where you will meet. 
All great men make plans before they go to work. 
Before Columbus discovered America, he had to plan about 
ships and money. Washington planned his battles before he 
fought them. Colonel Lindbergh planned his flight across 
the Atlantic Ocean. He planned what route he would take, how 
much gas he would need, and how long the trip would take him. 
Now you plan how you will do this stunt and then arrange these 
sticks in these boxes in the best possible order. 
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Arranging things in order means putting them where 
they belong. If a boy came· home from school and threw his 
books in the coal bin, his coat ,under the bed, and his ialoshes 
'on the table, we would not say he was orderly. But, if he set 
his books on the table, hung his coat on a hook, and left his 
galoshes in the hall, we would call him a very orderly boy, 
because he had put each thing in its proper place. That is just what you must do here. Put each stick in its proper 
place. Remember to plan first, then work. 
After the instructions were given, one minute was 
allowed to elapse before the signal II golf was pronounced. This 
was thought advisable in order to give the experimental group 
time in which to follow the planning instructions. The con-
I 
trol group, however, was alio given the minute before actual 
work was begu~, in order to keep the procedure uniform. When 
the subject indicatEdhe was satisfied with the arrangement of 
the sticks, he was told to look them over carefully and see if 
they were in the best possible order. If he decided they were 
not, he was permitted to change the arrangement. If he agreed 
they were in the best possible order, the sticks were turned 
out of the box, by the experimenter and.another trial was 
given, providing that the sticks were not in the best possible 
order. The trials continued until the time limit set for the 
experiment was reached. 
When correctly solved, the boxes in the first row 
on the left, and reading from top to bottom, should contain 
successively five long, fat sticks of,blue, lemon, white and. 
orange. The second row should contain five long, thin sticks 
of blue, lemon and white. The third row must have five short, 




















Bird-House Instructions Given Experimental Group. 
----------------------------------
One summer John's family went to live in his uncle's 
country home while his uncle was away on business. His uncle 
wrote him a letter asking him to put this bird-house together 




John began to plan how he would get the bird-house 
He knew that planning ahead would save .him time and 
When his plans were all made, he succeeded in putting 
together and hung it in the front yard. 
NOw, do just as John did. First, make a plan, then 
begin to put the house together so that it can be hung up. 
The parts of the house as represented in the 
photograph, and reading from top to bottom, are the floor, 
three screws, the ridge, the rod, the perch and the roof. 
The piece on the right of the picture is the hook. This 
arrangement was part of the standardized procedure &nd did 
not vary from one subject to another. 
The correct solution of this problem consisted 
in putting the perch through the smaller of the two holes 
in the front of the house. This had to be done by inserting 
the rounded end of the perch into the hole from the inside 
of the house. The second step was to put the rod through 
the holes in the perch and the midGle of the floor. Here 
the subject encountered two hidden difficulties. The rod 
was threaded on both ends to. receive the nuts, but one end 
contained more threads than the other. In the correct positio~ 
the end threaded the most must be placed at the bottom of the 
house. Before putting the rod in position, however, it was 
necessary to screw one of the nuts on to this end of the rod 
lS far up as possible. This nut held the perch firm. If 
lot screwed down, the perch would drop, due to a nail whic~ 
vas set in the end of it. Now a second nut must be screwed 
)n the end of the rod under the house. The roof was put in 
~lace next, the edges of the front and back walls fitting 
snugly into the grooves arranged for them on the side walls. 
The rod would go through the hole in the roof only when the 
latter was in a certain position. The ridge must next be 
placed on the top of the house. Finally, the hook must be 
put on the end of the rod protruding up from the top of the 
house, and a nut screwed on the rod in order to hold the hook 
in place and make it pOSSible to hang the house up. 
For a perfect solution of the bird-house problem 
a score of one hundred was given. The time limit set for 
working the problem was twenty minutes. A time bonus of two 
points was given for every minute under twenty in a perfect 
performanoe. When the perch was in the correct position, but 
not screwed down inside, ten points were deducted from one 
hundred. If tl1e rod was reversed, five paints were taken off. 
If the perch was put under the house, the penalty was twent¥ 
points. If the perch was put on top of the house, thirty 
points were assessed. Five paints each were taken off, if 
any of the remaining parts were out of place or not used. A 
penalty of sixty-five was imposed for not using the perch. 
Unforeseen major errors, such as placing the ridge under in-
stead of on top of the roof, or putting the perch through the 
large hole instead of the small one, were penalized ten 
points. Fiv6points ~ were deducted for unforeseen minor 
errors, such as turning the perch on the wrong side. 
70 
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The Bird-House . 




The following scores will contrast the performance 
of the subjects in the control group with that of the subjects 
in the experimental group. 
The average score made on the color-box by the girls 
in the control group was 68. The girls in the experimental 
group in this same experiment made an average score of 77. 
The boys' average score on the cOlor-box for the control group 
was 87, and for the experimental 90. The per cent of improve-
ment shown by the entire experimental group over the entire 
control group was 7.74. The median score of the girls' con-
trol group was 81, while that of the experimental was 85. In 
the boys' control group the median score on the color-box was 
90 and the median for the experimental was 115. 
The average time for the successful boys in the 
control group was six minutes. In the experimental group the 
average time for the boys who succeeded was five minutes. The 
average time for the girls in the control group who solved the 
problem was eight minutes, and in the experimental nine minutes. 
The average number of trials for all boys and girls of both 
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number of moves for all the girls in the control group was 
foty-nine, and in the experimental the girl$f average was 
forty-six moves. The boys averaged forty moves in the control 
group and thirty-six moves in the experimental. 
In the boys' control group correct solutions were made 
by nine subjects, or 60% of the group. The individuals of this 
group who had high I. Q.'s tended to make high scores on the 
color-box. The correlation between intelligence quotients and 
scores made on the color-box was .81. In the boys' experi-
mental group, eight, or 53-1/3%, made correct solutions. The 
correlation between intelligence and scores made on the color-
box by these boys was so low as to be negligible. 
In the girls' control group, four subjects, or 
26-2/3%, made correct solutions. The correlation between the 
I. Q. of the girls in this group and their scores on the color-
box was .05. In the girls' experimental group, eight, or 
53-1/3%, correctly solved the color-box. The correlation 
here was -.08. 48-1/3% of the sixty subjects successfully 
solved this problem. 
The correlations just recorded are not reliable 
because of the smallness of the groups. They do shOW, however, 
the general trend of these two groups. Correlations were also 
found for the entire control group and for the entire experi-
mental group, including both sexes. The rank difference 
method was used in calculating these correlations. This re-
sult was converted to ~ product-moments scores from which 
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the probable error was figured. 
• The correlations between the I. Q. and color-box 
scores for the control group was .44 = .16 and for the experi-
mental .02 r .08. Between the Kohs and the cOlor-box scores 
the correlation was .57 ± .08 for the control and -.11 t .10 
for the experimental. For the Maze and the color-box scores 
the correlation was .46 ± .10 for the control and .08 ± .04 
for the experimental. 
During the minute allowed before actual work began, 
the experimenter noted any signs of planning on the part of 
the subjects. Nine boys in the experimental and six in the 
control group very evidently compared sticks and boxes. Among 
the girls, six in the experimental and two in the control 
group showed signs of comparing sticks and boxes, or otherwise 
planning. Of these twenty-three who gave evidence of planning 
the work, twelve successfully solved the problem, while eleven 
succeeded in partially solving it. 
In every case the subject followed a plan of work. 
This plan was sometimes inadequate and a new one was tried or 
the same o~repeated. The arrangement of the sticks in the 
correct rows was failed on most frequently. This difficulty 
was not even overcome by the successful subjects until they 
had first arranged the sticks according to length, color and 
thickness. 
Ten of the subjects in the control group arranged 
the sticks according to length, color, and thickness, but not 
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according to rows. Three subjects started to put one of each 
of the four colors in each box, but they were unable to~follow 
this plan" through. One boy's plan WaS to arrange the colors 
together artistically as he had been taught to do in the art 
class. A girl in this group started to work on a plan of 
arranging the sticks in diagonal rows instead of in horizontal 
rows. Another subject put thicks and thins of one color in 
one box. Thirteen of this group followed the correct pl~, 
but no one of them was successful immediately. 
Ten in the experimental group arranged the sticks 
according to length, color, and thickness, but not according 
~!TOWs. Another attempt was made at a diagonal arrangement 
of rows by a member of this group. One boy's plan was to put 
two of each color in each box. A second boy attempted to 
place a lemon-colored stick in each box with two sticks of 
the same color, but of different thicknesses, on either side 
of it. One of the girls in this group tried the plan of 
alternating the four colors in each box. Sixteen of this 
group followed the correct plan, but also were not immediately 
successful. 
(~he Bird-House) 
The average score made by the girls in the control 
group on the bird-house was 66. The girls in the experimental 
group made an average of 83. The boys' average on the bird-
house for the control group was 100, and for the experimental 
.. 
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94. The per cent ot improvement made by the entire experi-
mental group over the control was 6.6. 
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The median score of the boy's control group was 114, 
and of the experimental group 80. The girls' median score in 
both the control and the experimental was 85. The average time 
of tho~who successfully solved the problem was eleven minutes 
for the boys of the control group and ten minutes for the exper-
imental group_ The girls in the control group solved the 
problem successfully in an average of seventeen minutes, while 
those of the experimental group averaged ten minutes. 
Eleven boys in the control group, or 73-1/3%, solved 
the problem correctly. In the experimental group, eight boys, 
or 53-1/3%, were successful. Four girls, or 23-2/3%, in the 
control group, and five, or 33-1/3% in the experimental, 
J 
succeeded in solving the problem correctly. 
The correlation between the I. Q. of the girls in 
thecontro1 group and their scores on the bird-house was .69. 
In the experimental group the coefficient of correlation for 
the girls was .52. The boys of the control group and the 
experimental group who have high I. Q.'s tend to make low 
scores on the bird-house. In the case of the control group 
the correlation is -.35, and for the experimental -.20. 
The correlation between the boys' bird-house control 
group and color-box control group ~as -.11. In the experi-
mental group several boys who made high scores on the bird-
house, also made high scores on the color-box. The correlation 
!:Sl. 
was .16. The correlation was positive between the girls of 
both groups and their scores on the bird-house and the aolor-
box. For the control group the correlation was .28, and for 
the experimental it was .26. 
The correlations for the entire control and the 
entire experimental groups were found between the I. Q. and 
the bird-house scores. In the contrClthe correlation was 
.10 t .10, and in the experimental .03 t .11. The correlation 
between the Kohs and bird-house scores was for the control 
.53 i .08, and for the experimental .16 i .09. The Maze was 
correlated with the bird-house scores and for the control 
group it was found to be .46 i .09 and for the experimental 
.11 :t .10. 
The scores made on the standard tests by the Sixty 
subjects included in both the control and experimental groups 
were correlated. The correlation between the Kuhlman-Anderson 
and the Maze was .60 ~ .06. Between the Maze and the Kohs the 
correlation was .73 t .04. The Kuhlman-Anderson and the Kohs 
correlation was .72 r .04. 
A composite score was found from the scores made by 
each group on the color-box and the bird-house. These composite 
scores were correlated with the scores made by the same group 
on the standard tests. The correlation of the composite 
scores made in the color-box and the bird-house with the scores 
made on the Maze was for the control group .55 j" .08 and for 
the experimental .11 :t .10. FoY' the Kohs· and composite 
scores the correlation was .70 ~ .06 for the control and 
.12 t .10 for the experimental. Between the composite ~core 
and. Kuhlman-Anderson the correlation was .36 r .11 for the 
control and .11 ± .10 for the experimental. 
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Interpretation of Results and Summary. 
A survey of the correlations shows a consistent 
tendency toward high correlations in the control group and 
low correlations in the experimental group. The only variable 
in the two groups was the instructions to plan given to the 
experimental group. This, then, would seem to be the cause 
of the low correlation in this group. 
The composite color-box and bird-house scores when 
correlated with the standard tests were also high for the con-
trol and low for the experimental group. This high correlation 
in the control group argues well for the worth of the color-box 
and bird-house as valid problems. It might also indicate that 
both these problems test to a fairly high degree the same abili-
ties as the standard tests. 
The low correlation between Kuhlm8.n-Anderson and 
bird-house control group scores may be the result of the 
mechanical ability required for the solution of the problem. 
The ability may vary in individuals having the same :1. Q..' , 
The color-box, on the other hand, calls for a generalization 
which may account for its high correlation with the Kuhlmen-
Anderson tests. 
The results obtained then indicate that the type of 
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instructions used in the experiment interfered with the correct 
solution of the problems. The non-effectiveness of the~instruc­
tions in producing the desired results m~y have been due to the 
fact that they were given only once and were too brief. It is 
possible that instructions to plan which could be varied and 
given over a longer period would be more effective. 
The two problems employed proved to be excellent 
means of investigating the problem-solving methods of children. 
Their speci&degree of difficulty permitted the experimenter 
to study the various levels of behavior of which the subjects 
were capable. 
A striving toward a definite goal dominated the 
performance of all the subjects. This was noticeable in the 
eagerness with which they began to work as soon as the signal 
to start was given. They seemed in haste to verify a tentative 
hypothesis which they had formed. After repeated failures, 
the subjects often resorted to a trial-and-error method. This 
mode of procedure frequently resulted in the attention being 
directed to certain important facts, the comprehension of which 
was necessary to the correct solution of the problem. An ex-
ample of this can be drawn from a typical performance in 
solving the color-box. The subject would place the sticks in 
the baxea ,at ·'r.alldo~ ,having no guiding plan in mind. These 
random moves resulting in focusing the attention on the dif-
ference in the thickness of the sticks, or the similarity 
of the number of sticks. As soon as the terms of the relations 
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were recognized, their relation to one another was quickly 
perceived. In other words, the relation of the sticks~o the 
boxes was apprehended. 
Similar examples can be found in the solution of the 
bird-house. After several failures, random manipulation of the 
various parts directed the attention to such salient features 
as the difference in the threading of the ends of the rod or 
a means of holding the perch firmly. These discoveries led 
eventually to the correct construction of the house. In many 
cases random movements did not have the favorable results Just 
reported. They very often resulted in a low score due to these 
additional moves and the time required to perform them and did 
not tend to insight into the problem. 
The cause of failure for the experimental group 
seemed to be not so much that they did not perceive the re-
lations, but that the terms of the relations were not cognized 
in themselves. For example, the perch was not recognized as 
a perch in many cases. Often it was entirely overlooked. Its 
relation to the house as a whole, of course, was also dis-
regarded. In the color-box problem, the different lengths, 
number,· and thickness of the sticks were not noted, and thus 
their relation to the boxes was not recognized. 
In some few cases the instructions helped in the 
correct solutions of the problems. This seemed to happen when 
the ideas of "order" and"bird-house" were definitely a part of 
the individualJg conscious processes. That is, when past 
experiences had given them a fairly wide conception of the 
terms II order II and "bird-house ll , they were equipped to p»oceed 
to the formation of a hypothesis. Planning the steps in the 
testing of the hypothesis was evidently possible ~or these 
subjects and the planning helped in their success. 
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The performance of Marvin B. in the experimental 
group is a case in pOint. This boy solved the color-box but 
failed to solve the bird-house. He is always extremely care-
ful about his personal appear&nce, and his predomin~ting char-
acter trait is preciseness. He plays often with his sister 
and does not care for boys' games. His home training has 
provided him with a wide experience in orderliness, which 
might account for his success in solving the cOlor-box. 
In the same group, Ha,rry L. and Merritt D. failed 
to solve the color-box, but did solve the bird-house. Their 
failure might be attributed to lack of experience. The ex-
perimenter has had occasion to visit the home of Harry L. and 
found it was very disorderly. Merritt D. is very careless 
about his personal appearance, and also comes from a care-
lessly kept home. These children have little or no training 
in keeping things in order and could almost be expected to 
fail on the color-box problem, as the concept of order has 
not become functional. 
The only boy in the control group who correctly 
solved the color-box but failed to solve"the bird-house was 
Willard B. This.boy is very docile, never giving any trouble, 
and is always very particular about his personal appearance • 
.. He is supervised exactly and often by his mother, who visits 
the school regularly. to receive a report of Willard's conduct 
from his teachers. This constant checking tends to make him 
almost effeminate. Here again, training and experience seems 
to be a factor in the correct solution of the color-box. 
Among the girls, examples of the effect of experience 
upon performance were also found. Dorothy N. in the control 
group was successful in solving the color-box but not the 
bird-house. She has been the kindergarten teacher's helper 
for two years. Her work in the kindergarten, where many small 
things are constantly being put in order, has perhaps helped 
her informing a universal idea of order, which surpassed the 
idea of order that the other children of her group had formed. 
In the experimental group, one girl who failed to 
solve the color-box solved the bird-house. This girl reports 
that she plays with her brother and likes bas~ball ~md auto-
mobiles. She also has had a bird at home. The experimenter 
suggests that these factors may have made it possible for 
Geraldine D. to solve the bird-house problem with greater 
facility. 
The predominating character trait that a child 
brings to the solving of a problem affects the result. Many 
children grow up without learning to try new things alone. 
They are timid a.nd panic-stricken in new situa.tions and lack 
self-confidence and self-assurance. Home training and school 
exper,iences are responsible. If a child is successful in what 
he does, he is willing to try new tasks, but, if he fai1s, he 
hesitates to try the next step. Some children meet new situ-
ations with interest, zest, and confidence, while others meet 
them with fear, excitement, shrinking or worry. While every 
effort was made to establish good rapport, one attempt could 
not be expected to correct habits of years' standing. Ex-
amples of the effect of predominant character traits were noted 
in the course of the study. 
In the experimental group, four girls, all very 
diffident, quiet, and retiring, succeeded in solving the 
color-box but failed in solving the bird-house. This problem 
required a pensistent effort in the face of repeated failures. 
These subjects seemed to be. overcome by the knowledge of their 
inability to solve the problem. This was evident from the re-
marks made by them as the work progressed. Such remarks as, 
"I cant do this," III'd make a fine carpenter," were accom-
panied by repeated attempts to secure the experimenter's 
opinion of the work. This lack of self-confidence resulted 
in many aimless moves and final failure. 
Renee L., the other subject who was successful in 
the color-box and not the bird-house, is an independent, self-
assured person. She ordinarily decides quickly and often finds 
it necessary to revise her decisions. She worked continuously 
in an unhesitating manner on both problems. Her very assurance, 
however, caused her to be a little impetuous. Because of this 
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she often spent time in testing hypotheses which proved to be 
wrong and immediately started to test out a new hypothesis be-
., 
fore gathering all the data. This method increased the number 
of moves and lengthed the time required to complete the prob-
lem, resulting in failure. 
Ruth P., Julia C. and Loretta S., the three girls 
in the control group who failed on the color-box but solved 
the bird-house, had I. Q. 's respectively of 126, 124 and 115. 
They are the three highest of the group. These three girls 
failed apparently because in each case they were so sure that 
their idea of "good order" was the best possible one that they 
felt no hesitation or need for change. Each had a definite 
plan. Julia C. arranged the sticks diagonally. Ruth P. 
arranged them according to colors and rows. Loretta A. at-
tempted to put one of each color in each box. These subjects 
succeeded in the bird-house because the ste,s in the solution 
of the problem are such as to indicate why a judgment is 
wrong, and they quickly revised their erroneous judgment. 
In summary, it may be sa.id that several factors 
affected the results obtained. Some of these have been noted 
in the control group and others in the experimental. Often 
the same factors affected the behavior of both groups. In 
some case·s special factors caused the behavior of the boys 
to vary and did not change the girls' reaction to the same 
problem and vice versa. Some of these factors were self-
consciousness in the case of two girls and one boy. Lack of 
confidence discouraQ:ement and loss of interest _waB_notAd 
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in the behavior of several girls while solving the bird-house 
problem. Lack of past experience was another cause of ~ailure 
for the boys in the solution of the color-box problem and for 
the girls in the bird-house problem. 
The greatest single factor affecting the results, 
however, was the instructions to plan. As has been stated, 
the correlations found are consistently high for the control 
group and low for the experimental. This would indicate that 
the instructions to plan interfered with the correct solutions 
of the problems. This interference of the instructions is 
also indicated in the average score on the bird-house made by 
the boys of the experimental group. This score, which is 94, 
is six pOints lower than the boys' control group scores for 
the bird-house. Eleven boys in the control group successfully 
solved the bird-house problem, while only eight were succes~­
ful in the experimental group. Nine boys in the control group 
successfully solved the color-box problem, but only eight boys 
in the experimental group were successful. 
Besides these scores which show thet the instructions 
interfered with the performance, we have others which indicate 
that they were helpful in the solution of the problems in cer-
tain instances. The average score on the color-box and bird-
house for the girls in the experimental group is ~arger than 
the average score made by the girls in the control group. The 
median score on the color-box made by the experimental group 
is higher than the madian for the control. Also, twice as many 
girls successfully solved the color-box oroblem in the exoeri-
~2. 
mental group as solved it successfully in the control. Five 
girls succeeded in solving the bird-house in the experiwental 
group and four in the control. Since the instructions to plan 
was the only variable in the experimental group procedure, it 
may be said to have improved the performance in the cases 
stated above. 
From the above summary it will be evident that our 
instructions to plan, while they frequently interfered with, 
often helped in the performance and sometimes had no effect 
at all upon it. In view of these results, we conclude that 
the influence of instructions to plan upon performance is 
unpredictable. The effectiveness of such instruction depends 
upon the degree to which they can be made to become the habitual 
response which a subject makes to a problem situation. A single 
short instruction cannot do this. Such an instruction succeeds 
or fails according to the intelligence, past experience and 
character of the subject. If the instructions are to be effect-
ive in all cases, they must be stamped in by frequent repeti-
tions over long periods of time. 
An attempt was made in this experiment to study the 
measurable influence of explicit instructions to plan upon the 
performance of complex tasks as contrasted with the performance 
01 the same tasks under such spontaneous tendency to plan as 
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